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Abstract 
 
For the first time in the history of mankind several powers emerge simultaneously in different lati-
tudes and can interact intensively. The Contemporary Global Order has presented significant chang-
es among which highlight the absolute and relative decline of American power, and the emergence of 
new actors who have greater agency power in their international relations. One of these actors is the 
so-called BRICS that brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. For this reason the 
aim of this investigation is to analyzing the effective and potential power of the BRICS in the Contem-
porary Global Order. The methodology is it is situated inside the analytical eclecticism which is char-
acterized by explaining a certain phenomenon without using a block of explanations sustained in a 
single tradition, but it takes and re-means the elements that it considers most pertinent for the case 
study. The article states that the BRICS do not claim or have the capacity to become hegemons. The 
objectives and capabilities of the BRICS have been especially notable in terms of international politi-
cal economy, especially in the financial architecture, where China has its greatest power. The BRICS 
can promote an alternative to the existing game rules in the international system and promote a 
more plural world. They have the capacity to reform and build international economic institutions 
that allow a fairer distribution of material resources. They can curb unilateral global power inter-
ventions in regional affairs, framing interventions for humanitarian causes within multilateralism 
and the Responsibility to Protect. In terms of democracy and human rights, they will not make any 
contribution since their main actors, such as China and Russia, are examples of disrespect for these 
values.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first time in the history of 
mankind several powers emerge simulta-
neously in different latitudes and can in-
teract intensively. The emergence of the 
Global South is the most significant phe-
nomenon of the contemporary Global Or-
der, reconfigures the dynamics of power, 
international institutions and internation-
al political economy. The Contemporary 
Global Order has presented significant 
changes among which highlight the abso-
lute and relative decline of American 
power, and the emergence of new actors 
who have greater agency power in their 
international relations. One of these ac-
tors is the so-called BRICS that brings to-
gether Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa. These countries share an 
increasingly large economic and commer-
cial weight worldwide, a significant demo-
graphic weight and a large territorial area 
with natural resources. 
For this reason the aim of this inves-
tigation is to analyzing the effective and 
potential power of the BRICS in the Con-
temporary Global Order. The hypothesis 
of the investigation is that the BRICS do 
not claim or have the capacity to become 
hegemons, but their objectives and capa-
bilities are especially notable in terms of 
international political economy, where 
have a strategy in two spaces, seeking to 
reform the institutions of the internation-
al economic system and creating new al-
ternative institutions. The methodology is 
it is situated inside the analytical eclecti-
cism which is characterized by explaining 
a certain phenomenon without using a 
block of explanations sustained in a single 
tradition, but it takes and re-means the 
elements that it considers most pertinent 
for the case study. 
The research is presented in three 
sections, BRICS Agenda has the purpose 
of analyzing the objectives of the BRICS 
through their joint declarations and the 
materialization or not of the proposed ob-
jectives; In BRICS countries: material and 
politic elements, the aim is to compare the 
agency capabilities of each of the coun-
tries that make up the BRICS, and finally 
the Role of the BRICS in the Contempo-
rary Global Order analyzes the influence 
of the BRICS over the Contemporary Glob-
al Order. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The methodology is it is situated in-
side the analytical eclecticism which is 
characterized by explaining a certain phe-
nomenon without using a block of expla-
nations sustained in a single tradition, but 
it takes and re-means the elements that it 
considers most pertinent for the case 
study. In this research, it is taken from the 
realist tradition, in its neorealist variables 
(Waltz, 1979) and the transition of power 
(Kugler & Organski, 1989), the distribu-
tion and inequality of material capacities, 
the policies of balance and counter- bal-
ance, and status in the international hier-
archy. From the liberal tradition 
(Keohane & Nye, 2012) the analysis of in-
ternational institutions is taken, especial-
ly that of the International Political Econ-
omy. Constructivism (Wendt, 1992) res-
cues the importance of socially construct-
ed interests and the world view generated 
by the context and the interaction of the 
actors. And, with greater emphasis, the 
critical tradition of the Global South 
(Acharya, 2018; Acharya, 2014) that not 
only complies with a description of the 
global order, but also proposes a new one, 
more just and plural governance from the 
Global South. 
Additionally, The heterogeneity 
within the BRICS group is noticed, so 
comparative analysis is used. The com-
parison allows determining similarities 
and differences between countries, allow-
ing a broader understanding of the varia-
bles subject to study, relating them to a 
set of categories of a general theory. The 
comparison with its inductive tracking 
method is of the event type - disaggregat-
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ed and systemic structure, which consti-
tutes the causal interpretation. 
Finally, the analytic instrument used 
are mixed, including discourse analysis of 
joint official statements, descriptive sta-
tistics and analysis of conjuncture, all in 
dialogue with a theoretical framework 
that problematizes fundamental catego-
ries such as emerging power and regional 
power. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
BRICS Agenda 
The immediate background of the 
BRICS can be found in the Eurasian strate-
gic triangle RIC (Russia, India and China) 
that since the 1990s presented proposals 
for the development of Asia and for issues 
of security and terrorism, and in the IBSA 
forums (India , Brazil, South Africa) of the 
2000s that focused on making diagnoses 
and criticisms of international financial 
organizations. In 2005 Brazil, Russia, In-
dia and China attended the Group of Eight 
summit (G-8) where there were certain 
approaches, then in 2006 the first formal 
meeting of the BRIC countries (without 
South Africa) took place in the United Na-
tions System (UN) where the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs met in the framework of 
the General Assembly. Subsequently, con-
sultations began among the member 
countries of the BRICs, meetings of for-
eign ministers at the UN and meetings of 
presidents of the Central Banks in the 
framework of the summit of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20). Finally, at the meeting of 
June 16, 2009 at the summit of Yekaterin-
bourg Russia, the identity and objectives 
of the group were constituted (Stunkel, 
2015; Luna, 2011). 
The financial crisis of 2008 served as 
a privileged scenario for the promotion of 
the BRICS and printed its profile with em-
phasis on the international political econ-
omy. The financial crisis not only ques-
tioned the material capacity of the central 
countries but also questioned the effec-
tiveness of the liberal economic institu-
tions and their model of doing politics. 
The financial crisis of 2008 was a 
consequence of the reduction of profit 
rates in the international economy. In 
much of the Western world, especially in 
the United States, the rate of profit of non-
financial companies fell significantly in 
the periods from 1950 to 1973 and from 
2000 to 2006, thus initiating a significant 
shift of capital in the direction of financial 
activity, All this in a context of rapid de-
regulation of financial systems and the 
almost unrestricted liberalization of inter-
national capital movements. Thus, the 
growth of the world economy is largely 
linked to speculative bubbles (Brenner, 
2009). This evidenced the need to expand 
the participation of emerging economies 
in the world economy and its institutions 
(Stuenkel, 2015). 
The countries of the Global South in 
general and the BRICS in particular man-
aged to face the economic crisis of 2008 
because their development models fol-
lowed different paths to the neo-
liberalism promoted by the international 
economic institutions of the Bretton 
Woods, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank . These countries in 
general have been characterized by State 
Capitalism, based on a strong state inter-
vention to promote productive develop-
ment policies and structural change based 
on exports, in addition to providing condi-
tions to attract foreign direct investment 
(Chang, 2009; Kiely, 2015). 
In this context of 2008, the G-20 
summit took place where the BRICs gave 
a joint statement highlighting the im-
portance of the participation of these 
countries in that summit to deal with the 
financial crisis, and the interest of these 
countries to achieve reform international 
institutions to reflect the new internation-
al scenario, including its greater gravita-
tion. 
After this joint declaration, the first 
formal meeting was held as a group at the 
aforementioned summit of Yekaterin-
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Table 1.  BRICS Summit 
Source: Processed by the authors (2019) 
 
Summit Place Date Goals 
First Summit Yekaterinbourg 
(Rusia) 
June 16, 2009 Strengthen the identity of the group and the 
questioning of the international economic or-
der 
Second summit Brasilia (Brasil) April 15-16, 2010 Questioning the international monetary sys-
tem; and cooperation agreements in science 
and education. 
Third Summit Sanya (China) April 14, 2011 Criticism of the International Monetary Sys-
tem 
Fourth Summit Nueva Delhi (India) March 29, 2012 Proposal for the creation of a new BRICS de-
velopment bank 
Fifth Summit Durban (Suda frica) March 26-27, 2013 The objectives of the new Development Bank, 
the initial capital contribution that would be in 
the USD 100 billion and cooperation with Afri-
can countries. 
Sixth Summit Fortaleza (Brasil) June 14-16, 2014 Constitution of the Development Bank and 
contingency reserve agreements of approxi-
mately 10,000 million dollars. BRICS-UNASUR 
Summit. 
Seventh Summit Ufa  (Rusia) July 8 - 9, 2015 Meeting with the countries of the Eurasian 
Economic Community. The first meeting of the 
governing board of the Development Bank of 
the BRICS. The creation of an Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank headed by China is an-
nounced. 
Eighth Summit Benaulim (India) October 15 - 16, 2016 The creation of a risk rating agency of the 
group was announced, in addition to an emer-
gency reserve agreement that serves as an 
alternative proposal to the IMF and WB. Euro-
pean countries are asked to give up two of 
their positions on the IMF board of governors 
to countries with emerging economies. 
Ninth Summit Xiamen (China) September 3 - 4, 2017 The strengthening of the New Development 
Bank of the BRICS was discussed. Meeting 
with the heads of state of Mexico, Egypt, Thai-
land, Tajikistan and Guinea. The crisis in the 
Korean Peninsula, promote investment agree-
ments in infrastructure and customs, It is 
mentioned that the international financial in-
stitutions must be reformed to improve global 
governance. 
Tenth Summit Johannesburgo 
(Suda frica) 
July 26 - 27, 2018 Meeting with African heads of State, in addi-
tion to the leaders of Argentina, Indonesia, 
Egypt, Jamaica and Turkey. It was discussed 
that group countries should increase trade 
between them. The anti-terrorist struggle was 
taken into account in the debates and meet-
ings. The rules prevailing in the current trade 
were criticized because they generate harmful 
effects in the African countries, besides con-
sidering that the war of tariffs affected the 
global trade flows. 
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bourg Russia 2009. This meeting was 
characterized by denunciations of institu-
tions from Bretton Woods, the use of the 
dollar as a reserve currency and world 
trade, and calls for these institutions to be 
reformed and adapted to the changes that 
are occurring in the international system. 
As we will see, these issues of internation-
al political economy have been central to 
all the summits held by the BRICS. 
The first two points of the joint dec-
laration show the purpose of changing the 
rules of the game on which the interna-
tional economic system is based, which 
favor the United States and its main part-
ners. Additionally, it is a way in which the 
BRICS are aware of their role as emerging 
economies and that the recovery from the 
crisis also depends on them. One aspect 
that stood out was the questioning of the 
use of the dollar as a reserve of value and 
medium of change in the world economy, 
which strengthens the disparity of the 
current economic agency. Other element 
found in the 2009 declaration is that mul-
tilateral trade should stabilize so that pro-
gress can be made in the Doha Round ne-
gotiations that are suspended. Issues such 
as climate change and sustainable devel-
opment were also discussed. 
However, the criticisms were fo-
cused on the fact that financial crises 
must be confronted in a better way and 
avoid the devaluation of the dollar. So far 
they have not sought an attack against the 
dollar to generate a crisis against that cur-
rency. For example, although the BRICS 
proposed as co-operation within the 
group a line of credit in their national cur-
rencies to promote development and 
trade, they did not change from dollars to 
other currencies their reserves that rep-
resent around a third of the world re-
serves (Struenkel, 2015). 
In the fifth part of the joint state-
ment, the importance of coordination and 
collaboration in the energy issue is ex-
posed to reduce the levels of uncertainty 
and volatility of the latter. In point six, UN 
reform was requested so that it could be 
more efficient when facing global prob-
lems. Point seven pointed to the commit-
ment in science and education. Followed 
in table 1 are the summits held and their 
main objectives. 
From the summits, it can be high-
lighted that in the third, South Africa be-
came a member of the club, being the only 
African country considered as an emerg-
ing power (Mandrup & Smith, 2015). At 
the fourth summit, the intention to create 
a new development bank was declared, 
although it did not materialize immedi-
ately, it was registered as part of the 
agenda for the next meeting. The fifth 
summit based in Durban South Africa fo-
cused on the cooperation relations of Afri-
ca and the BRICS, and the sixth summit 
held in Brazil had as guests Argentina and 
there was a meeting with the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR). 
The last two mentioned summits 
opened several meetings between the 
BRICS with different regions, within the 
framework of South-South cooperation. 
As highlighted by Gu, Carey, Shankland, & 
Chenoy (2016) the BRICS have criticized 
the international cooperation proposals 
that have been implemented so far, and 
have applied new practices such as tech-
nical and financial assistance without de-
manding reforms or implementing eco-
nomic policies as a counterpart, distin-
guishing itself from the traditional form of 
Bretton Woods financial organizations. 
China and Russia who are the main 
lenders of the BRICS are especially critical 
of conditional aid and have provided as-
sistance without economic policy con-
straints, let alone take into account hu-
man rights or democracy; however mac-
roeconomic and social instability in coun-
tries as Venezuela and Sri Lanka have 
made the corresponding payments im-
possible. In another aspect, the promotion 
of the model of State capitalism with the 
Chinese characteristics is another way to 
promote cooperation, some African coun-
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tries such as Ethiopia have sought advice 
in this regard (Gu, Carey, Shankland, & 
Chenoy (2016); Kiely, 2015). 
At these summits, the invited non-
member countries denounce the inequi-
ties of the current international economic 
system; they also seek to attract invest-
ments or trade agreements with the mem-
bers of the BRICS and create new cooper-
ation mechanisms for development 
(Struenkel, 2015). The invitation of non-
members of the BRICS seeks to promote 
critical positions towards international 
economic institutions. Additionally, they 
serve to promote cooperation and trade 
agreements between some countries and 
regions. 
The new BRICS Development Bank 
(NBD BRICS), the agreements to material-
ize it and the contribution of capital with 
a fund in Yuan were also created at the 
sixth summit. The NBD BRICS is an ideal 
instrument for development offerings for 
member countries as well as for non-
members, and thus attract other emerg-
ing countries and other regional integra-
tion groups such as the Eurasian Econom-
ic Community that was invited to the 
summit held in Russia and the African Un-
ion that was invited to the summit held in 
South Africa. The BRICS NBD is one of the 
main bets of the BRICS and particularly of 
China, especially after China is not satis-
fied with the increase of its share of votes 
in the International Monetary Fund. 
For China, the creation of the NBD 
BRICS is a way to avoid the obstacles it 
may encounter in order to move up in the 
decision making of the international fi-
nancial system. China has other multilat-
eral financial initiatives such as the Asian 
Investment and Infrastructure Bank, the 
Silk Road and the Road and Belt Initiative. 
All these initiatives seek to project the 
Asian giant as a leader in financial globali-
zation, in addition to having a presence in 
areas that it considers of vital importance 
to achieve its goal of global power. 
Finally, while the focus and continui-
ty of the BRICS agenda has been centered 
on the international political economy 
and its institutions, political institutions 
such as the UN Security Council have also 
been questioned, asking for the enlarge-
ment of its members permanent, which is 
of special interest for Brazil, India and 
South Africa as non-permanent countries 
at present (Coning, 2015). At the UN, they 
have also maintained a critical position in 
the face of unilateral interventions from 
the countries of the North, as in the case 
of Libya, and have maintained relations 
with different countries regardless of 
their internal political regime, although 
they have not agreed on other issues such 
as the climate change (Odgaard & 
Zhadaojiong, 2015). 
All these initiatives and summits 
serve to defuse the internal conflicts of 
the group and to generate the image of 
cohesion of emerging economies and the 
Global South in general, which seek to 
give international institutions a greater 
plurality. 
So far, although the BRICS group has 
made some progress, they do not make up 
a forum or a trade integration pact, and 
they do not have significant binding 
agreements and their progress as exem-
plified by the creation of a customs agree-
ment is timid. Its objectives have been 
other, and the fulfillment of them depends 
on the material and political capacities of 
each one of the countries. 
BRICS Countries: Material and Policy 
Elements 
The conditions of each country that 
make up the BRICS are different, not all 
have the same weightings within the 
group, nor within the regional and global 
order. Therefore it is necessary to analyze 
its material and policy elements individu-
ally. 
China in the BRICS group plays an 
increasing leadership role with its creden-
tials of global power due to its economic 
and financial conditions and the size of its 
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market. The other countries seek to in-
crease their weight, Brazil, India and 
South Africa are regional powers, and 
Russia seeks to project itself as powers of 
global importance but needs multilateral-
ism to be able to obtain results in its ac-
tions within the international system. 
China is an emerging power with 
global character. China is the most im-
portant country in the BRICS, in fact its 
GDP is three times more than that of India 
and Russia, it is the most populated coun-
try in the world, and it is one of the larg-
est countries in the world with an area of 
9,596,961 km2. It is also a nuclear power, 
has the army in the largest soldiers in the 
world and has an ambitious investment 
policy in armaments and military technol-
ogy, with special emphasis on the pres-
ence in the China Sea. China along with 
India tilted the world towards Asia (Luft-
Korin, 2009). 
China is the country of the BRICS 
that has greater material capacity to pro-
mote large projects; its geopolitical inter-
ests are expressed in its foreign policy 
first regionally in Central Asia and South-
east Asia, and then Africa and Latin Amer-
ica. For example, more than 3,000 Chinese 
companies operate in Africa and range 
from large state-owned companies to pri-
vate small and medium enterprises (Gu, 
Carey, Shankland, & Chenoy, 2016). They 
also highlight cooperation policies and 
investment in development infrastructure 
such as hydroelectric dams, railroads and 
airports, among others in Central Asia and 
Africa (Gu, Carey, Shankland, & Chenoy, 
2016). Table 2 shows the summary of Chi-
na's material elements.  
China is a nuclear power, it has be-
come the manufacturing center of the 
world, it is the main holder of debt of the 
United States, it has an active policy to 
obtain raw materials and it has become a 
financier in projects of the countries of 
Africa and South America. (Luna, 2011). 
Even authors like Ikenberry (2008) warn 
of a transfer of US hegemony to China and 
suggest that the United States cooperate 
with China in order to preserve its pre-
eminence on the international stage. 
The US-Chinese rivalry has been dip-
lomatic and commercial and no short-
Table 2.  Material elements of China  
Source: World Bank (2019) 
 
Years GDP  
(US $ at con-
stant 2010 
prices) 
Population Foreign direct 
investment 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
 (% of GDP) 
Imports of 
goods and 
services  
(% of GDP) 
Commercial 
Opening 
2008 5.04E+12 1324655000 1.72E+11 32.51957332 24.933299 1.14E-11 
2009 5.51E+12 1331260000 1.72E+11 24.45665122 20.148776 8.09E-12 
2010 6.10E+12 1337705000 1.72E+11 26.26741407 22.621885 8.01E-12 
2011 6.68E+12 1344130000 1.72E+11 26.49432272 24.105509 7.57E-12 
2012 7.21E+12 1350695000 1.72E+11 25.40819583 22.699663 6.67E-12 
2013 7.77E+12 1357380000 1.72E+11 24.50498149 22.060253 6.00E-12 
2014 8.33E+12 1364270000 1.72E+11 23.49505827 21.381502 5.39E-12 
2015 8.91E+12 1371220000 1.72E+11 21.34807161 18.104994 4.43E-12 
2016 9.51E+12 1378665000 1.72E+11 19.65837757 17.375439 3.90E-12 
2017 1.02E+13 1386395000 1.72E+11 19.7573801 18.046019 3.72E-12 
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term changes are foreseen. However, Chi-
na increasingly has a greater military 
presence in the South China Sea and an-
nounces increasing investment in its mili-
tary sector, especially in the Naval. This 
can lead to friction with the countries of 
Southeast Asia, including India, but also 
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines 
who are allies of the United States. Anoth-
er scenario of possible conflict is that gen-
erated by the Silk Road initiative due to 
the natural and historical zone of Russian 
influence in Central Asia and by the Mus-
lim populations of the countries of Central 
Asia. 
The United States has also de-
nounced that China artificially devalues 
the Yuan as a practice of unfair competi-
tion, does not respect intellectual proper-
ty rights, and foreign companies cannot 
operate openly in their territory since 
they must associate with locals to oper-
ate. 
However, China maintains a charac-
teristic of coexistence in its foreign policy. 
This is based on the promotion of order in 
international relations, in separating the 
political and economic aspects, and in 
seeking consensus for intervention in do-
mestic affairs of other countries. Within 
its foreign policy, it has also intensified 
cooperation with those countries that 
maintain opposing or alternative posi-
tions to the West. It has also avoided the 
use of force for the management of con-
flicts and has peacefully channeled terri-
torial claims (Odgaard & Daojiong, 2015). 
It should also be noted that China 
still has significant challenges such as re-
ducing poverty especially in rural areas 
and inequality, pollution problems, and 
objectives in which it does not show im-
provements or intensions to improve 
such as democracy or human rights. Addi-
tionally, the Chinese economic growth of 
the last thirty years has been based on the 
export of manufactures based on cheap 
labor, structural change to more complex 
production sectors is still pending. 
Russia, on the other hand, is the 
largest country in the world with 
17,125,246 km2 of surface area; it has one 
of the largest oil and gas reserves in the 
world, which are its main sources of tax 
and foreign exchange earnings. Its geopo-
litical position is very important since it is 
Table 3. Material elements of Russia  
Source: World Bank (2019) 
 
Years GDP  
(US $ at con-
stant 2010 
prices) 
Population Foreign direct 
investment 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
 (% of GDP) 
Imports of 
goods and 
services  
(% of GDP) 
Commercial 
Opening 
2008 1.58E+12 142742350 74,782,910,000 31.30959764 22.072932 3.37E-11 
2009 1.46E+12 142785342 36,583,100,000 27.93811458 20.4969696 3.32E-11 
2010 1.52E+12 142849449 43,167,780,000 29.21558677 21.1399635 3.30E-11 
2011 1.61E+12 142960868 55,083,630,000 27.9769231 19.9241769 2.98E-11 
2012 1.66E+12 143201676 50587560000 26.88344496 20.2261071 2.83E-11 
2013 1.69E+12 143506911 69218890000 25.79296505 20.4003902 2.73E-11 
2014 1.71E+12 143819666 22031320000 27.05302069 20.6459224 2.80E-11 
2015 1.66E+12 144096870 6852970000 28.60643166 20.5707851 2.97E-11 
2016 1.65E+12 144342396 32538900000 25.69897693 20.526401 2.79E-11 
2017 1.68E+12 144495044 28683950000 26.03958651 20.6884879 2.78E-11 
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located in Asia and Europe, it borders sev-
eral countries of Central Asia and some 
that were part of the former Soviet Union. 
It is also a nuclear power. Table 3 shows 
its material indicators. 
The increase in fiscal revenues de-
rived from the increase in the price of en-
ergy resources was an important tool to 
strengthen the state authority and the 
power of Putin, and face internal deterio-
ration with the fall of the USSR and the 
Boris Yeltsin government, and implement 
a stronger and tougher foreign policy 
against the West and the expansion of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). 
 Russia seeks to consolidate itself 
as a secure energy supplier for China but 
it presents geopolitical differences with 
this country due to its respective borders. 
In the same way there are tensions with 
the West, for what it considers its zone of 
influence in the westerly, such as the cas-
es of Ukraine, Georgia and their support 
for the government of Bashar Al-Assad in 
Syria. This has led him to be excluded 
from the G-8, especially by the annexation 
of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. He 
even raised his G-20 exclusion but it did 
not happen at all. That is why the Eura-
sian country has given importance to the 
BRICS to avoid international isolation An-
other Russian interest to participate in 
the BRICS can be seen in obtaining financ-
ing for infrastructure in rural areas and in 
their areas closer to Asia. In addition to 
proposing itself as a supplier of energy 
sources for two major Asian markets, Chi-
na and India, and thus minimize the im-
pact of possible EU sanctions on their ex-
ports. 
Like China, Russia raises the possi-
bility of maintaining relations with differ-
ent political and economic regimes in 
peaceful coexistence, and denounces for-
eign interventions in the Middle East and 
Africa, as in the case of Syria (Fleming & 
Sergunin, 2015). It also declares the im-
portance of the self-determination of na-
tions and the importance of freedom 
(Coning, Mandrup & Odgaard, 2015). 
However, this contrasts with his policies 
of interference with the former Soviet 
space of independent republics in Asia, 
such as the use of military force in Geor-
gia, the military invasion of the Crimean 
peninsula or his active participation in 
Syria. 
Although its political and social 
model is not so attractive for its dissemi-
nation in the world beyond those who 
have declared themselves authoritarian 
and some of the former Soviet countries, 
forms of cooperation have been imple-
mented to promote the Russian cultural 
and educational sectors. 
It should be noted that Russia pre-
sents great challenges for its economic 
performance; its growth is highly depend-
ent on the export of gas and oil to Europe. 
Its industrial sector, with the exception of 
the arms industry, is underdeveloped and 
in many cases in dismantling, which has 
been happening since the Soviet Union. 
Poverty also continues to be widespread, 
especially in its rural areas. 
India closes the Eurasian triangle of 
the BRICS. India is the second most popu-
lated country in the world, only behind 
China, and it is expected that in a few 
years it will be the most populated coun-
try in the world and with a young popula-
tion. Unlike China and Russia, India is a 
parliamentary and democratic country. It 
is one of the countries that have the great-
est diversity in the ethnic-religious, cul-
tural and linguistic in the world. Econom-
ic growth in recent years has been driven 
by the service sector, the software indus-
try and electronics. Additionally, during 
the administration of Prime Minister Nar-
endra Modi important commitments have 
been made in education, at a basic level 
and to increase the training of qualified 
personnel in high technology manage-
ment, as a way to compete in the world 
economy. Table 4 summarizes its material 
capabilities.  
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Indian foreign policy seeks to bring 
its Southeast Asian neighbors closer. India 
has significant tensions with China over 
territorial conflicts and distrust generated 
by Chinese military activity in the China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean. India also has a 
territorial conflict with Pakistan over the 
Kashmir region, which is especially dan-
gerous since both countries have nuclear 
power. Of his presence in Africa, his trade 
stands out, which in 2015 was 72,000 mil-
lion dollars, his position in forums such as 
the UN on respect for sovereignty and non
-interference in internal affairs, and his 
interest in obtaining natural resources 
(Gu, Carey, Shankland, & Chenoy, 2016). 
The foreign policy of India coincides 
with the Chinese and the Russian in main-
taining relations with different countries 
regardless of the type of internal regime, 
and does not consider that democracy 
should be promoted as a political regime 
in the world. But it differs from these 
countries because it maintains close ties 
of cooperation with the United States to 
increase its security capabilities, it even 
contributes to the maintenance of the 
rules of the international liberal order 
and its institutions while seeking to have 
a greater participation in them (Gupta & 
Chatterjee , 2015). 
Among the main challenges facing 
India, poverty stands out. The World Bank 
(2013) notes that 42% of Indians live be-
low the poverty line. Population growth 
can become an additional challenge for 
poverty reduction. Finally there are nu-
merous clashes between the populations 
of the Muslim and Hindu religions. 
Brazil is the only American partner 
that is within the BRICS. It is the country 
in Latin America with the largest popula-
tion and the largest South American coun-
try with 8.5 million km2 of surface area 
and with enormous wealth in natural re-
sources. It is a democratic country. It also 
has an important economic weight 
throughout Latin America. Followed in 
Table 5 are the material indicators of Bra-
zil. 
 In recent years, Brazilian foreign 
policy has focused on strengthening re-
gional institutions in South America such 
as the South American Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR). It uses the 
Table 4.  Material elements of India  
Source: World Bank (2019) 
Years GDP  
(US $ at con-
stant 2010 
prices) 
Population Foreign direct 
investment 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
 (% of GDP) 
Imports of 
goods and 
services  
(% of GDP) 
Commercial 
Opening 
2008 1.39E+12 1197146906 4.34E+10 24.26743306 29.4959396 3.88E-11 
2009 1.50E+12 1214270132 3.56E+10 20.61556009 26.161466 3.11E-11 
2010 1.66E+12 1230980691 2.74E+10 22.5904459 27.0984454 3.00E-11 
2011 1.77E+12 1247236029 3.65E+10 24.54041132 31.0834687 3.15E-11 
2012 1.86E+12 1263065852 2.40E+10 24.53443066 31.2592911 2.99E-11 
2013 1.98E+12 1278562207 2.82E+10 25.4308613 28.4132707 2.72E-11 
2014 2.13E+12 1293859294 3.46E+10 22.96796301 25.9542227 2.30E-11 
2015 2.30E+12 1309053980 4.40E+10 19.82442628 22.1222536 1.82E-11 
2016 2.47E+12 1324171354 4.45E+10 19.31492239 21.0342569 1.64E-11 
2017 2.63E+12 1339180127 4.00E+10 18.86741471 21.7746593 1.55E-11 
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National Development Bank (BNDES) as a 
way to finance infrastructure projects in 
Latin America and Africa. He has sought 
to have his companies present in Latin 
America and in Africa, especially in the 
area of infrastructure construction. It has 
created cooperation mechanisms with its 
neighbors in the hemisphere and with the 
Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa, 
especially with Angola, Cape Verde and 
Mozambique (Gu, Carey, Shankland, & 
Chenoy, 2016). Brazil has traditionally 
seen itself as a country that has served as 
a mediator in the dynamics with the coun-
tries of the region (Grotius, 2011). The 
rapprochement with China was promoted 
as an opportunity to export raw materi-
als, but causes concern that its industrial 
sector may be disadvantaged with Asian 
manufactures. (Castro, 2017). 
Finally, since the 2000s, Brazilian 
activism in multilateral organizations has 
become a key position in its foreign policy 
and its new approach towards its regional 
neighbors. This activism has been based 
on the idea of the Brazilian identity as a 
continental country, with special empha-
sis on regional integration as a new form 
of international insertion, and on the ob-
jective of transforming the country into a 
global trader in the medium term and 
turning it into a long-term global player. 
This strategy of autonomy through inte-
gration was proposed during the admin-
istration of Fernando Collor de Mello and 
deepened by Luis Ignacio "Lula" Da Silva 
(Deciancio, 2013). 
Like all the BRICS countries, Brazil 
faces important challenges in terms of 
poverty and inequality. Its economic 
growth is highly dependent on the export 
of primary products and is restricted by 
the volatility of the markets. Brazil is the 
country of the BRICS that invests least in 
innovation and technology. 
Finally, South Africa is the only Afri-
can country that is a member of this 
group. It has an area of 1,219,912 km2; it 
is located in the southernmost part of the 
African continent, bounded in the north 
by Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, as well as Lesotho and Swa-
ziland. It has one of the highest GDP in 
Africa, is a large producer and exporter of 
minerals and raw materials. Since the end 
of Apartheid in 1993 and the election of 
Nelson Mandela democracy was estab-
lished. Table 6 shows the main material 
elements. 
The fundamental interest of South 
Africa's foreign policy is to be an African 
countries intermediary in the internation-
al forums, as well as to have a commercial 
and diplomatic presence with its southern 
neighbors. The African country has partic-
ipated as the voice of Africa in multilat-
eral organizations since the fall of Apart-
heid (Stuenkel, 2015). Participation in 
peace missions and as a mediator in re-
gional conflicts in the region has been 
fundamental. South Africa's participation 
in the BRICS group gives it economic ben-
efits through increasing bilateral trade 
(Mandrup & Smith, 2015). He has been 
constantly working to attract Chinese in-
vestment in infrastructure. 
South Africa's challenge is to reduce 
social inequality and the poverty of the 
majority of the black population. It is one 
of the countries with the highest inci-
dence of AIDS in its population, 1 in 5 
people are infected with this disease, 
17.9% of adults are in these conditions, 
being one of the highest in the world 
(UNICEF, 2012) . It has one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the world, which 
stood at 26.4% in 2014 for the total popu-
lation and 48% for those under 25 years 
of age (Datosmacro, 2015). 
Thus, when looking at the economic 
performance of the BRICS countries, it can 
be found that they have an increasing 
weight in the world economy and trade. 
However, despite this greater gravitation 
they maintain important internal chal-
lenges, with problems such as poverty, 
inequality, low diversification and com-
plexity of their economic structures. 
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India, Brazil, South Africa and espe-
cially Russia, can be considered regional 
powers because of their relative advanta-
geous position with respect to their 
neighbors, but the great actor of the 
BRICS is China. China stands out within 
the group and globally in terms of eco-
nomic growth, territory and population, 
but its geopolitical superiority is based 
especially on its financial capacity. Its pro-
jection as a world power depends in large 
part on the strengthening of the BRICS 
and its leadership position internally. 
Their positions of coexistence allow 
them to reach agreements despite their 
divergent political systems, having India, 
Brazil and South Africa as democratic re-
gimes on the one hand, and the Chinese 
dictatorship and Russian authoritarian-
ism on the other. This also limits the 
group’s objectives in matters such as de-
mocracy and human rights. Much of the 
potential of the BRICS depends on reach-
ing agreements among them at a global 
level despite internal differences and in-
ternational interest. 
All BRICS countries have relative 
military strength; including China, Russia 
and India have nuclear power. But this 
element has not been fundamental in its 
tool in the Contemporary Global Order, 
since it is not an ideal instrument to 
achieve its main objectives, and it is the 
space where the United States maintains 
greater superiority. But it is an important 
persuasive element to avoid the unilateral 
interventions of the world powers in re-
gional problems or of any country in the 
region.  
BRICS Role in the Global Contemporary 
System 
Acharya (2018) defines the Contem-
porary Global Order as a multicomplex 
where the actors are more deeply inter-
connected and interdependent and power 
is decentralized in the sense that, despite 
the fact that asymmetries and hierarchies 
still exist, there is no global hegemony. 
The global agenda is pluralized and, espe-
cially, the agency capacity of all the actors, 
including the weak States, is pluralized, 
which is especially strategic not only for 
the countries of the Global South but also 
for the weak States or Middle Powers of 
the North that although they are not eco-
nomically and socio-politically weak in-
ternally, they may not be satisfied with 
Table 5.  Material elements of Brazil 
Source: World Bank (2019) 
Years GDP  
(US $ at con-
stant 2010 
prices) 
Population Foreign direct 
investment 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
 (% of GDP) 
Imports of 
goods and 
services  
(% of GDP) 
Commercial 
Opening 
2008 2.06E+12 192979029 50716402711 13.53400059 13.72356887 1.33E-11 
2009 2.05E+12 194895996 31480932200 10.85137114 11.2546046 1.08E-11 
2010 2.21E+12 196796269 88452079264 10.73819942 11.77920798 1.02E-11 
2011 2.30E+12 198686688 1.01E+11 11.46613801 12.23551783 2.30E+12 
2012 2.34E+12 200560983 86606502981 11.70305477 13.06225025 1.06E-11 
2013 2.41E+12 202408632 69686087841 11.63018213 13.93167816 1.06E-11 
2014 2.42E+12 204213133 97179590335 11.01194282 13.673463 1.02E-11 
2015 2.34E+12 205962108 74718044774 12.90019142 14.05343452 1.15E-11 
2016 2.26E+12 207652865 77794463497 12.49461885 12.07966389 1.09E-11 
2017 2.28E+12 209288278 70685049298 12.56757437 11.55218258 1.06E-11 
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the disparity of power and lack of repre-
sentation in international institutions. He 
warns that this Multicomplex Global Or-
der is not a post-West one since the Unit-
ed States will maintain an important role 
and the central elements of the previous 
institutional order persist, but South-
South relations are being built with great-
er dynamism, and North-South relations 
are each more interdependent and recip-
rocal, even points out that the constitu-
tion of the new Global Order is independ-
ent of the decline of North American pow-
er, since for the first time in the history of 
humanity several countries simultaneous-
ly and in different locations emerge and 
can interact and affect the Order Global as 
a whole. 
Especially important for the Global 
South is what Acharya (2014) observes of 
this multicomplex world referring to the 
greater importance that regionalism and 
the regional order take, since the emerg-
ing powers of the Global South are pre-
sented as regional powers and the weak-
est countries they have greater agency 
capacity at this scale, conditions are gen-
erated so that regional powers with aspi-
rations to project their power globally are 
legitimated at the local level, which is an 
incentive to offer public goods and a more 
constructive relationship in general, addi-
tionally the powers with global preten-
sion have greater limits in this scenario of 
more developed regionalisms. 
McFarlane (2006) points out that 
emerging powers are considered to be 
those countries where power grows and 
are able to dispute the hierarchy of the 
prevailing international system, and may 
alter results of policies or actions promot-
ed by other states. Langehove, Zwatjes & 
Papanagnou (2016) also point out that 
the categorization of regional power de-
pends on their financial and monetary ca-
pacities, military strength, energy securi-
ty, among others, but especially on the 
possibilities of influence and provision of 
public goods for the neighbors. 
In this sense India, Brazil and South 
Africa can be considered emerging pow-
ers. Russia is a traditional power if we 
take into account its immediate past as 
one of the poles of the bipolar world. And 
China from a broader historical perspec-
tive could also be considered as a tradi-
tional power. Russia and China are not 
properly emerging but return of powers. 
And all the BRICS countries, including 
those that are neighbors and share some 
areas of influence, are additionally region-
al powers. 
In addition to its regional power 
BRICS countries have the capacity to in-
fluence beyond their regional spaces. Chi-
na and India thanks to their economic, 
political and cultural resources are of 
great influence worldwide. Russia, due to 
its past as a nuclear superpower and its 
competition with the United States, has 
maintained international influence and 
recognition of its projection of power. 
Brazil thanks to historical, cultural and 
linguistic links maintains important ties 
with Africa. South Africa also maintains 
ties with the Middle East (Kingah & Quili-
coni, 2016). 
Noltle (2010) warns that during the 
North American hegemony the regional 
subsystems were within the conditioning 
of the world hierarchy, and that the Unit-
ed States interferes in its dynamics to 
maintain the balance and status quo that 
allows it to preserve its interests. While in 
the contemporary period the emergence 
of regional powers has allowed to gener-
ate coalitions and channel demands of au-
tonomy in front of world powers, and alli-
ances in international forums to resolve 
or autonomously avoid regional conflicts. 
The rise of emerging powers allows 
other smaller countries to join them to 
diversify their international relations. 
This has configured a multipolar or apolar 
world; since the alliances and the actions 
of the countries are diffuse and fluid, it 
does not have the clarity and stability that 
it had in the bipolar or unipolar world 
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(Gratius, 2008). 
The strategy of the BRICS countries 
at a global and regional level has been 
preponderantly of coexistence. The strat-
egy of coexistence consists of persuasion 
and attraction skills to influence the deci-
sions of other countries with more mod-
est capabilities and without threats of 
conflicts. The basic principles of the coex-
istence strategy are mutual respect for 
sovereignty, interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries only within the 
framework of multilateral agreements, 
and the promotion of mutual benefits. 
Each member of the group will prioritize 
these principles in their foreign policy de-
pending on the region in which they are 
located, their neighbors and the global 
aspirations that they have (Coning, Man-
drup & Odgaard, 2015). 
Nye (2011a, 2011b, 2003) states 
that in contemporary times the power is 
distributed in the form of three-
dimensional chess, where there is an up-
per board corresponding to classical mili-
tary affairs, an intermediate board refer-
ring to the economic and finally the lower 
board where the transnational affairs un-
fold. United States in the top board is still 
the hegemon without any competition in 
sight, in the economic board increasingly 
loses more space with the emergence of 
countries like China, and in the lower 
board increasingly has less control over 
terrorists, drug dealers weapons and 
drugs, hackers among other matter. At the 
beginning of the 21st century the United 
States was responsible for almost half of 
the world's military expenditures, no coa-
lition could counterbalance or be able to 
establish a balance of military power of 
the traditional type, in fact since the time 
of Rome there has been no other nation 
that prevailed so widely over the others. 
Therefore, the main area of action of 
the BRICS has been on the board of the 
institutions of international political econ-
omy. As previously noted, the BRICS 
countries and especially China consider 
that the institutions of the international 
economic system derived from the Bret-
ton Woods agreements after the Second 
World War, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), are 
 
Table 6.  Material elements of South Africa 
Source: World Bank (2019) 
 
 
Years GDP  
(US $ at con-
stant 2010 
prices) 
Population Foreign direct 
investment 
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
 (% of GDP) 
Imports of 
goods and 
services  
(% of GDP) 
Commercial 
Opening 
2008 3.70E+11 50,412,129 9885001293 35.62243807 37.24295217 1.97E-10 
2009 3.64E+11 50,970,818 7624489974 27.91188817 27.50637343 1.52E-10 
2010 3.75E+11 51584663 3693271715 28.61523693 27.37375583 1.49E-10 
2011 3.88E+11 52263516 4139289123 30.46094153 29.65169022 1.55E-10 
2012 3.96E+11 52998213 4626029122 29.72387936 31.17582008 1.54E-10 
2013 4.06E+11 53767396 8232518816 30.97134112 33.2704187 1.58E-10 
2014 4.14E+11 54539571 5791659020 31.46864521 32.9658559 1.56E-10 
2015 4.19E+11 55291225 1521139945 30.15604561 31.4441028 1.47E-10 
2016 4.21E+11 56015473 2215307020 30.70259741 30.08792761 1.44E-10 
2017 4.27E+11 56717156 1371931600 29.77288874 28.40673945 1.36E-10 
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restrictive for their interests, are at the 
service of the United States and its allies, 
and reflect a dynamic of power that no 
longer corresponds to the current one, 
and for that reason they seek to reform 
them. In the IMF the United States has the 
greatest weight; it is who has the highest 
number of votes, which are calculated ac-
cording to the quotas provided by each 
country. China especially since 2014 has 
demanded that these quotas be reformed 
for the votes since the size of its Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) and that of its inter-
national reserves has grown, however the 
reform that was carried out has not left it 
satisfied. 
China in the search for an alternative 
financial architecture seeks to attract oth-
er countries that are dissatisfied with the 
current rules of the game and offers them 
incentives such as financing for infra-
structure and development, which in 
many aspects can be obtained more easily 
than in the Bretton Woods multilateral 
organizations (Destradi, 2010). 
The BRICS and especially China, 
work in two arenas in parallel, in one seek 
to reform institutions, noting the im-
portance of their economies in the inter-
national system, so they must be taken 
into account to establish the rules of the 
game. In the second, they are creating 
other international institutions that coex-
ist and allow the generation of alterna-
tives to contemporary ones, with an em-
phasis on the South-South vision. The 
weighting of the strategies and the critical 
vision of the institutions of international 
political economy vary within the group, 
with China and Russia being the most crit-
ical and India the least. 
Finally, on the third board, on trans-
national issues, the BRICS together with 
the G-20 are two of the main examples of 
the relative success of multilateralism, 
while the multilateral capacity of the Unit-
ed States has fallen to its historical lows, 
especially during the administrations of 
George W. Bush and Donald Trump. In the 
Contemporary Global Order multilateral-
ism is even more necessary; in this the 
BRICS also advance the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The BRICS do not claim or have the 
capacity to become hegemons. In military 
matters, its capabilities are only persua-
sive and secondary because the United 
States continues to maintain an unques-
tionable command in this area and its 
main objectives require other instru-
ments. In matters of transnational affairs, 
despite its limitations, it has been one of 
the clearest examples of the success of 
multilateralism in the Global South. The 
objectives and capabilities of the BRICS 
have been especially notable in terms of 
international political economy, especially 
in the financial architecture, where China 
has its greatest power. 
In this matter of international politi-
cal economy the BRICS have proposed a 
strategy in two spaces, on the one hand 
seeking to reform the institutions or rules 
of the international economic system to 
have greater participation in the decision 
making of those institutions, while on the 
other hand They are creating new alter-
native institutions and regional blocks in 
parallel, as well as acting individually 
with their initiatives and commercial and 
financial agreements. 
The BRICS can promote an alterna-
tive to the existing game rules in the in-
ternational system and promote a more 
plural world. They have the capacity to 
reform and build international economic 
institutions that allow a fairer distribu-
tion of material resources. They can curb 
unilateral global power interventions in 
regional affairs, framing interventions for 
humanitarian causes within multilateral-
ism and the Responsibility to Protect. In 
terms of democracy and human rights, 
they will not make any contribution since 
their main actors, such as China and Rus-
sia, are examples of disrespect for these 
values. 
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